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A FAIR TRIAL, NOT A PERFECT ONE: THE
EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY CAMPAIGN
FOR THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE
ROGER A. FAIRFAX, JR.*
A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
From just after the turn of the twentieth century through World War II,
there was a great deal of activity around criminal justice reform. Much like
today, many commentators in the early twentieth century considered the
American criminal justice system to be broken. With regard to all of its
phases—substance, sentencing, and procedure—the criminal justice system
was thought to be inefficient and ineffective, and it failed to inspire the
confidence of the bench, bar, or public.
Against this backdrop, a group of reformers sought to address the
shortcomings of early twentieth-century criminal justice—during what I
consider the ―Golden Age‖ of criminal justice reform. Many contemporary
scholars can attest to the richness and depth of the criminal law and procedure
scholarship in the law journals in the first third of the twentieth century. In
addition to research conducted by full-time law professors during this era,
judges and practicing members of the bar were frequent authors of legal
scholarship on various problems vexing the criminal justice system.
These judges, lawyers, and law professors often gathered to discuss
various topics in criminal law. These discussions and collaborations
ultimately produced concrete reform proposals, many of which would go on
to be implemented in law and practice. This era of reform is a fascinating
study in the effective advancement of the legal profession through the
coordinated efforts of those who practice, study, apply, and interpret the law.
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. A.B., Harvard
College; M.A., University of London; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank the
participants in the Marquette University Law School Criminal Appeals Conference and Professor
Lisa Fairfax for their feedback on an earlier version of this Article. The Article benefited greatly
from student research assistance provided by Rebecca Rodgers, Turia Meah, and Hans-Christian
Latta. Gratitude is also due to George Washington University Law School reference librarian Herb
Somers and Jordon Steele, archivist at the University of Pennsylvania Law School Library, which
houses the archives of the American Law Institute. All errors are mine. This Article is dedicated to
the memory of Edward B. Bell, Sr. (1931–2009).
1. U.S. v. Lutwak, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
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This Article focuses on one aspect of the early twentieth-century criminal
justice reform movement—procedural reform in the criminal context. 2 More
specifically, it examines the movement to reform criminal appellate procedure
in the early twentieth century. The centerpiece of this movement—and,
arguably, one of the most significant objectives of the larger criminal
procedure reform project—was the adoption of the harmless error rule.
Although there are nuanced and important differences between different
formulations of the harmless error rule, the basic model in the criminal
context provides that when an appellate court notices error at trial, it is not
bound to reverse a conviction and grant a new trial unless that error had some
bearing on the outcome. In other words, if the verdict would have been the
same even had the error not occurred, the conviction can stand. 3 This Article
seeks to explore not the functional meaning of the rule, 4 but the fascinating
story of how and why it came into being.
Part II of the Article provides the historical context from which the
movement for the harmless error rule sprang. Part III illuminates the
personalities and institutions involved in the surprisingly coordinated effort to
establish the harmless error rule in American criminal appellate procedure. In
Part IV, the Article explores the rhetoric and tactics employed by the
reformers in their campaign to change the landscape of criminal appellate
review and to capture the hearts and minds of appellate judges and the
profession as a whole. Part V sheds light on the reformers‘ final victory on
the federal stage—the adoption of the harmless error doctrine by judicial

2. Although this Article focuses on criminal procedural reform, it should be noted that reform
efforts aimed at early twentieth-century substantive criminal law and civil procedure were just as
robust as, and sometimes were intertwined with, the criminal procedural reform project. For
example, the campaign for a federal harmless error statute sought (and obtained) a rule applicable to
both criminal and civil cases. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762 & n.15 (1946);
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 61; Judicial Code of the United States, ch. 231, § 269, 36 Stat. 1087, 1163
(1911) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 391 (1926)).
3. Again, there are important nuances (some of them consequential) distinguishing various
formulations of the rule used in various procedural contexts. The primary distinguishing feature of
varying articulations of the harmless error rule is the requisite level of certainty we require of the
reviewing court regarding the impact of the error on: (1) the jury‘s verdict; (2) the defendant‘s rights
(―substantial rights‖); or (3) the interest of justice (―miscarriage‖). For treatment of the important
distinctions among variants of the harmless error rule, see, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human,
But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1175–
80 (1995); see generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988,
988 (1973). However, the aforementioned general explanation of the harmless error rule is sufficient
for purposes of this Article on the historical background of the campaign for the harmless error rule.
4. For scholarly treatment of how the harmless error rule functions in modern criminal justice,
see, e.g., ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.,
Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2027 (2008); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1 (2002);
Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1994).
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rulemaking in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Article
concludes with thoughts about the importance of the harmless error rule
campaign for the broader criminal procedure reform project of the early
twentieth century, and how we might assess its enduring success.
II. THE ERA OF PRESUMED PREJUDICE AND AUTOMATIC REVERSAL
Why was there such a strong emphasis on a harmless error rule within the
early twentieth-century criminal reform agenda? We may lack appreciation
today for how criminal appeals looked to the early twentieth-century
reformers. After all, for the past forty years, we have operated under a regime
in which the Supreme Court has explicitly approved the state and federal
appellate courts‘ application of harmless error review to most federal
constitutional errors. This sits in stark contrast to the dominant criminal
appellate practice in the early twentieth century, in which virtually any
error—pleading errors, evidentiary errors, and constitutional errors—would
be deemed presumptively prejudicial and often would prompt automatic
reversal of the conviction and the granting of a new trial to the defendant. 5
This approach derived from English practice. An 1835 English case in the
Court of Exchequer is thought by most to be the beginning of an era in which
error at trial was thought to be presumptively prejudicial or subject to
automatic reversal.6 Almost forty years later, in 1873, Parliament authorized
English courts to implement a harmless error rule in civil cases. 7 Nearly
thirty-five years after that, Parliament passed the Criminal Appeal Act of
1907, imposing a harmless error rule in criminal cases, 8 although English
judges took slowly to the idea of applying the harmless error rule.9
American courts were broadly influenced by the old Exchequer rule of
automatic reversal followed by English courts in the nineteenth century. 10 By
the beginning of the nineteenth century, it is fair to say, the prevalent
approach in American courts was to apply a presumption of prejudice or a

5. Meltzer, supra note 4, at 20.
6. See Crease v. Barrett, (1835) 149 Eng. Rep. 1353, 1353 (Exch. Div.); Fairfax, supra note 4,
at 2032. Judge Traynor has argued persuasively that the English approach toward trial error was due
to an incorrect interpretation of Crease v. Barrett. See TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 6–8.
Nevertheless, the Crease case began an era when an appellate finding of error at the trial level
virtually guaranteed reversal of the verdict and the grant of a new trial. Fairfax, supra note 4, at
2032.
7. See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 48 (Eng.).
8. See Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 4 (Eng.) (―Provided that the court may,
notwithstanding that they are of [the] opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in
favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice
has actually occurred.‖).
9. See TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 11.
10. Fairfax, supra note 4, at 2033.
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strict rule of automatic reversal in criminal (and civil) cases upon a finding of
error below. 11 As one might imagine, such an approach, whatever its merits,
led to absurd results, such as granting convicted murderers new trials because
of the misspelling of non-essential words or other typographical errors in the
indictment, or minor and inconsequential evidentiary errors at trial.12 Such
instances were widely reported and often sensationalized in the media, which
led to growing public outcry over perceived ―technicalities‖ and ―formalism‖
in criminal appellate practice. 13
Nevertheless, American legislatures were slow to follow Parliament‘s lead
in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century to rid the old
Exchequer rule of automatic reversal from criminal appellate practice. 14 As
American reformers often complained (with regard to the harmless error rule
and a number of other items on the criminal procedural reform agenda),
American courts and legislatures seemed to adhere steadfastly to practices
inherited from the English, long after the English had discarded the approach
as unsatisfactory.15 American appellate courts of this era were described as
―impregnable citadels of technicality,‖16 which created an environment where
―the fear of reversal hangs as a sword of Damocles over the heads of
prosecutors and trial judges.‖17
Against this backdrop, the criminal procedural reform project‘s campaign
for the harmless error rule was set in motion.18 For these reformers, the
adoption of a harmless error rule in American criminal appellate practice
would lead to improved efficiency of, and enhanced public confidence in, the

11. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 4, at 20; Austin W. Scott, The Progress of the Law, 1918–
1919—Civil Procedure, 33 HARV. L. REV. 236, 250 (1920).
12. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 65-1949, at 1 (1911); State v. Campbell, 109 S.W. 706, 708–09
(Mo. 1908); see also EVERETT P. WHEELER, SIXTY YEARS OF AMERICAN LIFE: TAYLOR TO
ROOSEVELT, 1850–1910, at 403 (1917); WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION 425 (1929); Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of the Administration of Criminal
Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A. J. 217, 219–20 (1925) (recounting instances of
appellate reversal on grounds perceived to be technical); John Henry Wigmore, Case Comment,
―Good‖ Reversals and ―Bad‖ Reversals, 4 ILL. L. REV. 352, 353 (1909).
13. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 1005–06 n.56.
14. However, a number of state legislatures did beat Congress to the punch. See, e.g., H.R.
REP. NO. 65-913, at 2 (1919) (listing states that previously had implemented the harmless error rule
by statute or court rule (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 62-611, at 2 (1912)).
15. See, e.g., LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 190 (1939); Roscoe Pound,
The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING
REP. 395, 405 (1906).
16. Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 222.
17. Herbert S. Hadley, Present Conditions Historically Considered, 11 A.B.A. J. 674, 678
(1925); see also WILLOUGHBY, supra note 12, at 417.
18. See, e.g., TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 14; James W. Garner, Campaign for Reform of
Judicial Procedure, 2 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 331 (1912).
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criminal process.19 In addition, the formalistic rules and requirements, the
violation of which frequently triggered reversals and grants of new trials, were
themselves often the target of the reform agenda.20
However, the adoption of a harmless error rule was important to the
reform agenda not only on its own merits, but also because the strict rule of
automatic reversal, which dominated early twentieth-century criminal
appellate practice, was emblematic of the antiquated procedural regime the
criminal procedural reform project, as a whole, was seeking to dismantle. The
harmless error rule, therefore, had tremendous symbolic value. By replacing
the strict rule of automatic reversal with the harmless error rule, the reformers
would be making a powerful statement on the direction criminal procedural
practice was to take as a complement to the reform and modernization of
criminal justice administration in the United States.
III. THE CAMPAIGN FOR HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW
Who were the players responsible for the adoption of the harmless error
rule? The campaign consisted of an effective coalition of highly respected
individual members of the legal profession, as well as a collection of powerful
law reform institutions. The identities of these reformers and the manner in
which they collaborated on the harmless error rule provide tremendous insight
to the inner workings and aims of the larger early twentieth-century criminal
procedure reform project.
A. Individuals
Despite the harmless error rule campaign‘s strong institutional grounding
described below, perhaps what is most remarkable is the impressive array of
prominent individual lawyers, judges, and scholars enlisted in the cause. 21
John Henry Wigmore, the preeminent expert in the field of evidence, lent his
considerable clout to the campaign for the establishment of the harmless error
rule. Wigmore, who had taught law in Japan and later served as dean of
Northwestern University Law School for twenty-eight years, was a strong
proponent of law reform, including in the area of procedure. 22 He served on
the Joint Committee on Improvement of Criminal Justice, which featured the
combined efforts of the American Bar Association, American Law Institute,
19. See, e.g., Judge Charles F. Amidon, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the D.N.D., The Quest for Error and
the Doing of Justice, Address Before the Minnesota State Bar Association (Apr. 1906), in 40 AM. L.
REV. 681, 691 (1906).
20. For example, indictment pleading requirements were the source of many ―hypertechnical‖
findings of error necessitating reversal. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 109 S.W. 706, 709, 715 (Mo.
1908); William E. Mikell, A Proposed Draft of a Code of Criminal Procedure, 5 J. AM. INST. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827 (1915).
21. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946).
22. See WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE : SCHOLAR AND REFORMER (1977).
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and Association of American Law Schools. 23 His writings advocating the
legal community‘s embrace of the harmless error rule added credibility to the
reformers‘ efforts, particularly as they challenged the automatic reversal for
evidentiary trial error.24
Herbert S. Hadley, chancellor of Washington University in St. Louis and
former governor of Missouri, was a key member of the committee of the
American Law Institute to investigate defects in criminal justice
administration.25 Hadley not only helped lead the American Law Institute‘s
work on criminal procedure reform in the 1920s, he also served as an
ambassador for such efforts to the outside world, often recounting the
progress of the reformers in various periodicals. 26 Bemoaning the poor state
of the criminal justice system in the early twentieth century, Hadley placed
blame at the feet of the ―present burden of technicality and formalism that a
dead past has imposed upon it.‖27 Hadley also chaired a committee of the
National Crime Commission,28 which, in the mid-1920s, produced a set of
proposed criminal procedure reforms, including a harmless error provision. 29
The note to the harmless error provision proposed by Hadley‘s committee
asserted that the presumption of prejudice approach of appellate courts of the
era was ―the most disastrous doctrine that has developed in the criminal

23. Id. at 221. In addition, Wigmore was tremendously active in each of these three
organizations separately. Id. at 220–26. Furthermore, Wigmore was the organizer of the 1909
National Conference on Criminal Law and Criminology, which brought together hundreds of
delegates from across the nation to discuss criminal justice reform. Id. at 60–61; James W. Garner,
Editorial Comment, The American Institute of Law and Criminology, 1 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2–5 (1910). The conference spawned the American Institute of Criminal Law and
Criminology, ROALFE, supra note 22, at 62, an important source of scholarly support for the criminal
reform movement in the early part of the twentieth century. Wigmore served as the first president of
the Institute, see id. at 5, which under Wigmore‘s leadership founded the Journal of the American
Institute of Criminal Law & Criminology, id., and produced a set of reforms in the form of a
proposed criminal procedure code, see, e.g., Mikell, supra note 20, at 827; Jennifer Devroye, The
Rise and Fall of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 7, 7–8 (2010).
24. See, e.g., 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 21 (rev. vol.
1983); John H. Wigmore, ―Reversible Error,‖ 19 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC‘Y 28 (1935) [hereinafter
Wigmore, ―Reversible Error‖].
25. See, e.g., Hadley, supra note 17, at 675.
26. See, e.g., Herbert S. Hadley, Outline of Code of Criminal Procedure, 12 A.B.A. J. 690
(1926) [hereinafter Hadley, Outline of Code]; Hadley, supra note 17, at 674; A.L.I., REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (1935) [hereinafter ALI REPORT].
27. Hadley, supra note 17, at 679.
28. Hadley, Outline of Code, supra note 26, at 690. Also serving on the sixteen-member
committee were Roscoe Pound and John Wigmore. Id.
29. See id. at 693 (―On the hearing of an appeal a judgment of conviction shall not be reversed
on the ground of misdirection of the jury or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of
pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the appellate court, after an examination of the record
before the court it shall appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.‖).
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jurisprudence of America.‖30
Everett P. Wheeler, a prominent leader of the New York bar and
champion of civil service reform, was one of the most consistent and effective
voices advocating criminal procedural reform just after the turn of the
twentieth century. 31 Wheeler, who was a frequent writer and speaker to the
academic and practitioner communities,32 also took his message of the need
for criminal procedural reform to the general public. 33 One theme that jumps
out from Wheeler‘s writings is the notion that procedure plays an essential
role in crime control, order maintenance, and in quelling compulsion toward
vigilantism. 34
Lester Orfield, easily one of the most influential criminal law academics
of the first half of the twentieth century, also lent his considerable prestige to
the campaign for harmless error reform. Orfield was a prolific scholar of
criminal law and procedure and lent a keen eye toward diagnosing and
offering solutions to problems of criminal justice administration. Just as
Hadley and others in the campaign had complained regarding criminal
procedure more generally, Orfield often argued that twentieth-century
criminal appellate procedure was burdened by the formalistic approaches of
the past.35 In particular, Orfield cited the inclination of appellate courts to
reverse criminal convictions on technical grounds.36 As is discussed below,
this emphasis on appellate reversals due to ―technicalities‖ would be a central
rhetorical weapon of the harmless error campaign.
William Howard Taft, the only person to serve both as President and
Chief Justice of the United States,37 was a forceful advocate of criminal

30. Id.
31. See WHEELER, supra note 12, at 403. The 1917 New York Times book review of Wheeler‘s
memoir credits him with making significant contributions to tariff reform, civil service reform, and
the reform of municipal government in New York City. Sixty Years of American Life: Mr. Everett P.
Wheeler’s Reminiscences of Well-Known Men and Affairs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1917, at BR3 (book
review).
32. See, e.g., Everett P. Wheeler, The American Bar Association‘s Recommendations as to
Judicial Procedure (Jan. 28–29, 1909) (paper presented at the 32nd Annual Meeting of the New York
State Bar Association), in 1909 N.Y. ST. BAR ASS‘N PROC. 32–50. Interestingly, Wheeler also had a
special interest in, and wrote an early twentieth-century biography of, Daniel Webster. See EVERETT
PEPPERRELL WHEELER, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE EXPOUNDER OF THE CONSTITUTION (1905).
33. See, e.g., Everett P. Wheeler, Procedural Reform in the Federal Courts, 66 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (1917) [hereinafter Wheeler, Procedural Reform]; Everett P. Wheeler, Letter to the Editor, Reform
in Criminal Procedure, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1903, at 8 [hereinafter Wheeler, Letter to the Editor].
34. See, e.g., WHEELER, supra note 12, at 403; Wheeler, Procedural Reform, supra note 33, at
9; Wheeler, Letter to the Editor, supra note 33, at 8.
35. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 190.
36. See, e.g., id. at 182.
37. See, e.g., ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT : CHIEF JUSTICE 17 (Univ.
Press of Am. 1983) (1964).
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procedural reform,38 including criminal appellate reform in the form of the
harmless error rule,39 throughout the early twentieth century. Even while
serving as President, Taft spoke out in favor of criminal procedural reform. 40
Although it may seem odd today for a sitting commander-in-chief to engage
on such a level, Taft had been a state prosecutor, state trial judge, federal
appellate judge, law school professor, and dean in his early career,41 so his
experience and associations made him uniquely positioned and inclined to use
the ultimate ―bully pulpit‖ to advance the campaign for the harmless error
rule. When his presidency ended in 1913, Taft not only took a chair in law on
the Yale College faculty and joined the Yale Law School faculty, 42 he also
assumed the presidency of the American Bar Association, 43 the organization
which—as is discussed below—made the most concrete progress toward
establishing the federal harmless error rule. Later, as Chief Justice, Taft
would remain a critic of criminal law administration in the United States. 44
Also among this impressive group of reformers was the eminent legal
scholar, Roscoe Pound. Indeed, Roscoe Pound might be thought of as the
father of the larger early twentieth-century criminal procedure reform
project—and not only because of his voluminous and meticulous research on
the functioning of American criminal courts, which supplied much of the
undergirding for the effort.45 Pound, who has been referred to as the ―high38. See, e.g., William H. Taft, The Administration of Criminal Law, Commencement Speech to
Yale Law School (June 26, 1905), in 15 YALE L.J. 1, 16–17 (1905).
39. See, e.g., Nathan William MacChesney, A Progressive Program for Procedural Reform,
3 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 528, 530 (1912).
40. See, e.g., William H. Taft, First Annual Message of the President (Dec. 7, 1909), available
at http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3782 (last visited Apr. 23, 2010) (―In my
judgment, a change in judicial procedure, with a view to reducing its expense to private litigants in
civil cases and facilitating the dispatch of business and final decision in both civil and criminal cases ,
constitutes the greatest need in our American institutions.‖); William H. Taft, Administration of
Criminal Law, Commencement Speech to Yale Law School (June 26, 1905), in WILLIAM H. TAFT ,
PRESENT DAY PROBLEMS: A COLLECTION OF ADDRESSES DELIVERED ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS 333
(1908); see also Third Annual Report of the Standing Committee to Suggest Remedies and Propose
Laws Relating to Procedure (Sept. 3–5, 1919) (presented at American Bar Association meeting )
[hereinafter Third Annual Report 1919], in 5 A.B.A. J. 455, 457 (1919); Marcus Cauffman Sloss,
Reform of Criminal Procedure, 1 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 705, 705 (1910).
41. FREDERICK C. HICKS, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: YALE P ROFESSOR OF LAW & NEW
HAVEN CITIZEN 10–11 (1945).
42. Id. at 29, 48.
43. Id. at 83.
44. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 37, at 278 (quoting Chief Justice Taft as once stating that ―the
administration of criminal law in the United States is a disgrace to our civilization‖). Taft was
dogged in his efforts at federal judicial reform and served as the catalyst for the eventual adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, eight years after his death. See id. at 88–120.
45. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1930); RAYMOND FOSDICK
ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922); Roscoe
Pound, The Canons of Procedural Reform, 12 A.B.A. J. 541, 545 (1926) [hereinafter Pound, The
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priest of the forces concerned with the improvement of criminal justice,‖ 46
gave a rousing address in 1906 at the Minnesota State Capitol building where
the twenty-ninth annual gathering of the American Bar Association was
convened. 47 The speech, which some consider to be ―the most influential
paper ever written by an American legal scholar,‖48 was the ―call to action‖ to
the legal profession on the issue of procedural reform. 49 In the address,
Pound, then dean at the University of Nebraska Law School (ten years before
accepting the deanship at Harvard Law), 50 decried what he termed the
―sporting theory of justice,‖51 in which lawyers would plant error in the record
with the knowledge that appellate courts would grant a new trial if the jury
ultimately did not rule in their favor.52 Pound thought this situation was
attributable, in significant part, to the technical and formalistic approach being
taken by appellate courts in assessing and remedying error at trial. 53
These and other prominent legal figures worked independently and
collaboratively in varying combinations under the sponsorship and auspices of
several leading law reform entities dedicated to the establishment of the
harmless error rule in criminal appellate practice. Although, as discussed
below, the institutional players are often cited as being responsible for the
establishment of the harmless error rule, the true credit belongs with the
aforementioned group of loosely affiliated individuals. This notion goes
beyond the observation that any institution is only as effective as the
individuals who comprise it. Instead, it highlights the prestige and skill these
individuals lent to the cause, along with the diligent effort they expended in its

Canons]; see also FRANKLYN C. SETARO, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE POUND
(Eldon R. James ed., 1942). Pound was also responsible for laying the groundwork of the massive
and influential restatement project of the American Law Institute. PAUL SAYRE, THE LIFE OF
ROSCOE POUND 258 (1948).
46. Harvard Law School Library, Roscoe Pound Papers, 1888–1964 Finding Aid,
http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~law00087 (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
47. See SAYRE, supra note 45, at 260; see Pound, supra note 15, at 395–417.
48. Rex E. Lee, The Profession Looks at Itself—The Pound Conference of 1976, 1981 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 737, 738 (quoting WILLIAM T. GOSSETT ET AL., Foreword, THE P OUND CONFERENCE :
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 7 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979)); see
also Symposium, Centennial Reflections of Roscoe Pound’s ―The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice,‖ 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 849, 849–942 (2007). But see Russell R.
Wheeler, Roscoe Pound and the Evolution of Judicial Administration, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 943 (2007).
49. Although Pound limited his comments to civil procedural reform, see Pound, supra note 15,
at 396, many of his observations, such as those critiquing the automatic reversal regime, see id. at
405, applied with equal force to the criminal context.
50. See SAYRE, supra note 45, at 137–60, 208–46.
51. Pound, supra note 15, at 404, 406.
52. Id. at 404–05.
53. Id. at 406, 413–14.
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favor—all of which ultimately spelled success for the harmless error rule
campaign.
B. Institutions
Although the aforementioned reformers often worked in an individual
capacity, they also collaborated under the auspices of many law reform
entities active in the early twentieth century. These entities, such as the
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (also known as
the Wickersham Commission),54 the Association of American Law Schools, 55
and the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, 56 all were
integral to the campaign of lobbying legislators, producing scholarship, and
shaping public opinion in favor of the adoption of a harmless error rule.
However, two institutions in particular, the American Bar Association and the
American Law Institute, were at the forefront of the successful effort to
establish the harmless error rule.
1. American Bar Association
With its ability to bring together the bar, bench, and academy, the
American Bar Association (ABA) served a key role in the adoption of a
harmless error rule, as well as the larger criminal procedure reform project. 57
A review of the archives of the American Bar Association Journal, which was
a widely read and influential periodical in the early twentieth century, reveals
the steady march of advocacy on this and other procedural reforms advanced
by the ABA through its Standing Committee to Suggest Remedies and
Propose Laws Relating to Procedure. 58 The ABA Standing Committee
lobbied vigorously in the states and drafted proposed federal legislation
establishing a harmless error rule in both civil and criminal cases in federal
courts. The ABA‘s proposed legislation amending the federal Judicial Code
read in relevant part as follows:
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or
motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court
shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record
54. See, e.g., MASON, supra note 37, at 153–55. It has been noted that although the Hooverappointed Crime Commission was chaired by former Attorney General George Wickersham, Roscoe
Pound was the true workhorse of the effort. See SAYRE, supra note 45, at 119.
55. ROALFE, supra note 22, at 221; Report of the Joint Committee on the Improvement of
Criminal Justice, 54 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 513, 513 (1931) [hereinafter Report on
Improvement of Criminal Justice].
56. ROALFE, supra note 22, at 60–62; see also Devroye, supra note 23.
57. See, e.g., Everett P. Wheeler Congratulates the American Bar on Its First Victory for
Reform in Judicial Procedure, 72 CENT. L.J. 123 (1911) [hereinafter Wheeler Congratulates].
58. See, e.g., First Annual Report of the Standing Committee to Suggest Remedies and Propose
Laws Relating to Procedure, 3 A.B.A. J. 507 (1917) [hereinafter First Annual Report 1917].
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before the court, without regard to technical errors or defects
or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.59
A bill largely parroting this ABA-drafted legislation passed the House of
Representatives in 191660 but languished in the Senate due to concerns
expressed by a number of Senators that the harmless error rule ―created too
strong a presumption in favor of the correctness of the judgment in the court
of first instance.‖61 After revision and wordsmithing, ABA legislation was
introduced in the Senate and eventually reported out from the Senate Judiciary
Committee, only to be held over by individual Senators with grave concerns
about the legislation, a pattern that played out over several sessions of
Congress.62 Finally, in 1919, the legislation passed both houses of Congress
and was signed into law by President Woodrow Wilson. 63 The ―harmless
error‖ statute read as follows:
On the hearing of any appeal . . . , in any case, civil or
criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination
of the entire record before the court, without regard to
technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.64
A reminder of the ABA‘s influence lies in the fact that the language of the
1919 law was derived almost entirely from that of the ABA proposal. 65 The
59. Id. at 507.
60. The legislation went through several iterations in the House in response to various
concerns, but the core harmless error provision received consistent support. See H.R. REP. NO. 64264 (1916); H.R. REP. NO. 63-1218 (1914); H. REP. NO. 62-1066 (1912); H.R. REP. NO. 62-611
(1912); H.R. REP. NO. 61-1949 (1911).
61. First Annual Report 1917, supra note 58, at 507. A significant reason for opposition in the
Senate was an aversion to the application of a harmless error rule in criminal cases. Saltzburg, supra
note 3, at 1010 n.67. Records of the reform efforts show that a coordinated lobbying effort was
undertaken in the Senate. See, e.g., Wheeler Congratulates, supra note 57, at 123 (urging supporters
to attempt to persuade members of the Senate Judiciary Committee to support the harmless error
legislation). Interestingly, the ABA had argued that the proposed legislation was important to the
nation‘s war effort. First Annual Report 1917, supra note 58, at 508 (―[T]he passage of [the
harmless error legislation] would be of great service to the government and to the public in the
litigation which was certain to arise during the present war.‖).
62. See, e.g., Wheeler, Procedural Reform, supra note 33, at 11–12; First Annual Report 1917,
supra note 58, at 507–08; Ninth Annual Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and
Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, 2 A.B.A. J. 603
(1916).
63. Third Annual Report 1919, supra note 40, at 455; H.R. REP. NO. 65-913 (1919).
64. Act of Feb. 26, 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-281, 40 Stat. 1181 (amending Judicial Code § 269,
36 Stat. 1163 (1911)).
65. Compare text accompanying note 59 with text accompanying note 64. See also H.R. REP.
NO. 62-611 (1912) (―The bill, as originally drawn, was prepared by a committee of the American Bar
Association.‖); Everett P. Wheeler, Disregarding Technical Errors, 89 CENT. L.J. 390, 390 (1919).
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statute, later described by the U.S. Supreme Court as ―a reaction to the
hypertechnicality that had developed in American jurisprudence,‖66 was a
significant legislative victory for the reformers. Moreover, the federal
legislative campaign helped to raise the profile of the reform movement in the
states, yielding legislative victories there as well. 67
However, the statute establishing a harmless error rule in federal cases
was limited in its impact. First, it did not reach errors grounded in violations
of constitutional or statutory rights. 68 Second, the statutory commands of the
1919 law and similar state statutes insufficiently instructed appellate judges
on how to assess whether an error was prejudicial. 69 Perhaps most important
for the reformers, as with the English experience just after Parliament‘s
passage of its harmless error rules, the 1919 Act of Congress failed to capture
the ―hearts and minds‖ of federal appellate judges. 70 In other words, despite
the legislation, many appellate courts still operated under the old approach, in
which trial error was deemed to be presumptively prejudicial. 71 Much more
work needed to be done to make these legislative victories complete; part of
that work fell to the American Law Institute.
2. American Law Institute
In the early 1920s, the ABA, the Association of American Law Schools,
and the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology—all major players in the
criminal procedural reform project in their own right—all requested that the
American Law Institute (ALI) develop a model code of criminal procedure. 72

66. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 471 (1986).
67. See, e.g., S.S.P. Patteson, A Blow at Technicalities, 18 VA. L. REG. 161, 161–65 (1912);
Wheeler, Procedural Reform, supra note 33, at 12–16; Third Annual Report 1919, supra note 40, at
456–57 (noting that, by 1919, over half of the states had adopted some form of the harmless error
rule).
68. See, e.g., Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939) (―Suffice it to indicate what
every student of the history behind the Act of February 26, 1919, knows, that that Act was intended
to prevent matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and minutiae of
procedure from touching the merits of a verdict.‖); Kamin, supra note 4, at 10.
69. See, e.g., TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 15–17; ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 196; see also
Paul M. Hebert, The Problem of Reversible Error in Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV. 169, 170 (1932);
N.C. Collier, Harmless Error, 72 CENT. L.J. 151 (1911).
70. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 196; Wigmore, ―Reversible Error,‖ supra note 24, at
29; see also Lester B. Orfield, Appeal Under the American Law Institute Code of Criminal
Procedure, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 437, 453 (1935) [hereinafter Orfield, Appeal Under the American Law
Institute].
71. See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEX. L. REV. 126,
146–47 (1926). But see HARLAN F. STONE, LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 116–17 (Colum. Univ.
Press 1967) (1915); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Progress of the Law, 1919–1922—Evidence (pt. 3),
35 HARV. L. REV. 673, 711 (1922) (noting changes in appellate practice in the wake of the passage of
harmless error legislation).
72. See ALI REPORT, supra note 26, at 3; CHARLES B. HOWLAND & HERBERT F. GOODRICH,
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In response to the call, in 1925 the ALI Committee to Study Defects in
Criminal Justice, led by Herbert Hadley, reluctantly undertook the massive
task of proposing a model set of criminal procedural rules. 73 As the result of
several years of work, in 1930 the ALI Council adopted a model Code of
Criminal Procedure containing rules that covered most aspects of the criminal
process, from arrest, pretrial, and grand jury proceedings, to trial through
posttrial motions, judgment, and appeal. 74 This model code also contained a
harmless error provision:
No judgment shall be reversed or modified unless the
appellate court after an examination of all the appeal papers is
of the opinion that error was committed which injuriously
affected the substantial rights of the appellant. It shall not be
presumed that error injuriously affected the substantial rights
of the appellant.75
Within a decade of the ALI‘s adoption of the model Code of Criminal
Procedure, Congress and many state legislatures passed statutes establishing
harmless error review. 76 Still other states had established harmless error
review by judicial decree. 77 Given the high esteem in which the ALI is held,
its model Code‘s harmless error provision represented important validation of
the legislative trend toward harmless error review. 78
IV. RHETORIC AND TACTICS OF THE REFORMERS
Despite the ABA‘s successful work toward the passage of the 1919
federal harmless error rule, and the ALI‘s considered adoption of a harmless
error provision in its model Code a decade later, there remained about a dozen
holdout state jurisdictions where the reformers were unable to establish a
A.L.I., THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE —A SHORT DESCRIPTION 4 (1931).
These
organizations, particularly the ABA, ALI, and Association of American Law Schools, had a history
of combining efforts on procedural reform. See, e.g., Report on Improvement of Criminal Justice,
supra note 55, at 513.
73. See A.L.I., REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY THE COMMITTEE ON A SURVEY AND STATEMENT
OF THE DEFECTS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 52–54 (1925) (recommending to the ALI Council that a
restatement of criminal procedure not be undertaken by the Institute at that time).
74. See CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Official Draft 1930).
75. Id. at 169–70; see also Orfield, Appeal Under the American Law Institute, supra note 70, at
453. From the outset of the ALI‘s work on criminal procedural reform, appellate ―[r]eversals for
unsubstantial error‖ were considered to be a major problem with the status quo. See WILLIAM E.
MIKELL & EDWIN R. KEEDY, A.L.I., A PLAN FOR THE PREPARATION OF A CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 8 (1925).
76. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 195 n.52; Hebert, supra note 69, at 172–76;
Sunderland, supra note 71, at 147.
77. Sunderland, supra note 71, at 147.
78. However, as is discussed below, some harmless error reformers believed that establishment
of the harmless error rule through rulemaking was superior to legislative adoption. See infra Part V.

446

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[93:433

harmless error rule.79 Furthermore, even in jurisdictions with a harmless error
statute, there persisted the perception among reformers that the hearts and
minds of appellate judges had not been sufficiently changed such that they
ceased to reverse convictions for technical errors under the harmless error
statute.80 Likewise, many practitioners‘ views of appellate practice had been
forged in the era of automatic reversal, and hence, they were not inclined to
push for changes in appellate practice.81 Additionally, there were concerns
regarding the public perception of fairness under a regime in which not all
trial errors led to a new trial for a criminal defendant. 82 Therefore, the
reformers not only sought out legislative victories, but also looked for ways to
influence public opinion, as well as the mindset of the bench and bar through
the use of robust rhetoric regarding the harmless error rule, and a new vision
of the appellate function in criminal cases.
Certainly, the reformers‘ primary mode of persuasion was to trumpet the
ways in which a harmless error rule would enhance the efficiency,
effectiveness, and fairness of the criminal justice system. These worthy aims
mimicked those of the larger criminal procedure reform project. However, a
survey of the literature and speeches produced by the reformers‘ advocacy
efforts from the turn of the twentieth century through World War II reveals a
number of rhetorical themes that provide insight to the unique strategies and
priorities of those engaged in the campaign for the harmless error rule.
A. Responsibility of the Appellate Bench
Many in the harmless error campaign sought to place the blame for the
problems of the presumed prejudice and automatic reversal regime squarely at
the feet of the appellate bench.83 Reformers often advanced the idea that
appellate judges were fearful of judging and, in applying a strict rule of
automatic reversal, were simply hiding behind the argument that they should
avoid trampling on the jury‘s prerogative. 84 Also, some reformers appealed to
the notion that, because many appellate judges generally were drawn from socalled ―better classes‖ of society and the profession, they were expected to

79. ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 195 n.52.
80. See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note 71, at 146–47 (describing the problem as one of
―professional psychology‖); Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 222–23.
81. See, e.g., Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 222–23.
82. See, e.g., G.N. Williamson, Letter to the Editor, Is All Error Presumptively Prejudicial?,
84 CENT. L.J. 309, 309–10 (1917); ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 196–97.
83. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 182.
84. John Wigmore wrote in 1935 that judges‘ steadfast adherence to the automatic reversal
approach ―labels as senseless mechanized robots the incumbents of a high office whose function
presupposes in every cause the conscious exercise of mature wisdom and intelligent justice.‖
Wigmore, ―Reversible Error,‖ supra note 24, at 29.
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support and apply the harmless error rule for the benefit of the profession and
society.85
In support of the desired attitudinal shift on the part of appellate judges,
some reformers called for unification of the trial and appellate bench, and
rotations of appellate judges for service on the trial bench. 86 The hope was
that, as a result of this trial experience, appellate judges would be more
sensitive to the impact of reversals on the work and morale of trial courts. 87
Additionally, some reformers also called for appellate judges to be appointed,
rather than elected,88 and for a norm of brevity to be imposed on the drafting
of appellate opinions—the idea presumably being that in fewer reporter pages,
there would be less temptation and opportunity for appellate judges to engage
in reasoning leading to reversals.89 The reformers‘ call for the harmless error
rule was complemented by another key item of the larger criminal procedural
reform agenda: the call for waiver of jury trial. 90 The reformers not only
considered the ability to waive jury trial a tremendous efficiency benefit,91 but
some reformers also thought jury trial waiver would avoid jury instructions
and evidentiary errors at trial that led to perceived abuses of appellate review
in the automatic reversal regime. 92
Another rhetorical device reformers often utilized to influence appellate
judges was the perceived nexus between the lack of a harmless error rule and
increasing crime rates in many urban jurisdictions across the country in the
early twentieth century.93 Reformers often characterized such rising crime
85. See, e.g., Hadley, supra note 17, at 678; Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 222–23.
86. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 197; Orfield, Appeal Under the American Law
Institute, supra note 70, at 453; Pound, The Canons, supra note 45, at 545.
87. See, e.g., Orfield, Appeal Under the American Law Institute, supra note 70, at 453.
88. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 202–03; Orfield, Appeal Under the American Law
Institute, supra note 70, at 453.
89. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 203–04; Orfield, Appeal Under the American Law
Institute, supra note 70, at 453.
90. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 206–08; Orfield, Appeal Under the American Law
Institute, supra note 70, at 453.
91. See, e.g., Charles S. Potts, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal: A Book Review,
26 TEX. L. REV. 607, 623 (1948) (reviewing LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM
ARREST TO APPEAL (1947)); cf. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury
Clause, 91 MINN. L. REV. 398, 430–37 (2006). Even the most ardent of the early twentieth-century
reformers advocating for waiver in jury trials likely would be surprised by the ubiquity of plea
bargaining in today‘s criminal justice system. See, e.g., Michael M. O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining and
Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 409 (2008).
92. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 206–08; Orfield, Appeal Under the American Law
Institute, supra note 70, at 453. Related to this was a proposal to make criminal appeals
discretionary so as to ensure that those filed had substantive merit. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note
15, at 202.
93. See, e.g., Hadley, supra note 17, at 674–75; Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 217–21; see also
Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 1005–06 n.56. It should be acknowledged that some reformers decried
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rates as a direct result of the automatic reversal regime, in which, given the
difficulty of securing conviction on retrial, 94 criminals were portrayed as
escaping just conviction due to ―technicalities‖ noticed by appellate courts. 95
Reformers thus linked the harmless error rule to public safety. As one
commentator wrote in 1926, ―[i]n their zeal for the protection of the defendant
the courts too often forget that the public are also entitled to be protected.
This is deplorable.‖96 The use of such rhetoric is somewhat curious given that
in many jurisdictions, criminal appeals were relatively rare, with prohibitive
record and filing fees, lack of counsel, and other barriers to most defendants
obtaining appellate review of their convictions. 97 In fact, as Lester Orfield
pointed out in the early 1930s, most criminals were being set free not because
of appellate rulings but because of police error or exercises of prosecutorial
discretion to nolle pros or dismiss cases. 98 However, perhaps because a
significant proportion of criminal appeals that proceeded resulted in reversal,
the reformers had an effective rhetorical device. 99

the inadequacy of crime statistics recordkeeping and reporting in the first part of the twentieth
century. See, e.g., THORSTEN SELLIN, CRIMINAL STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES 504 (1931).
M.K. Wisehart conducted a quantitative study demonstrating that ―crime waves‖ in one city were
largely manufactured by ratcheting up media coverage of relatively stable rates of crime. See
FOSDICK ET AL., supra note 45, at 544–55.
94. See, e.g., George B. Rose, Why Justice Limps in Pursuing Crime, 60 AM. L. REV. 321,
333–34 (1926) (noting the difficulty of securing a conviction on retrial).
95. See, e.g., RAYMOND B. FOSDICK, CRIME IN AMERICA AND THE P OLICE 29–34 (1920);
Wigmore, supra note 12, at 353–54; see also Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 218–20.
96. Rose, supra note 94, at 334; see also Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 223 (―The tenderness of
technicality which has so long encouraged and shielded the criminal is about to meet the awakening
anger of an endangered public.‖).
97. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 183.
98. Id. at 183–84.
99. On a related note, some reformers cited the scourge of lynching in the early twentieth
century as a rationale for adopting and applying criminal procedure reforms, including the harmless
error rule. See, e.g., John David Lawson, Technicalities in Procedure, Civil and Criminal, 1 J. AM .
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 83–84 (1910); Taft, supra note 38, at 16–17. Reformers
sometimes exploited opportunities presented when the media covered lynchings supposedly
motivated by community frustration with the slow speed of justice, particularly when earlier
convictions had been reversed on appeal. See WHEELER, supra note 12, at 403 (recounting the
Virginia case of a ―[N]egro desperado‖ who was shot while allegedly resisting arrest after having
escaped from pretrial detention for three prior convictions in the same case that were overturned on
appeal); Wheeler, Procedural Reform, supra note 33, at 9 (noting the ―connection between lynch law
and a certain proneness in the courts to grant new trials‖). Interestingly, despite the high-profile
work Ida B. Wells and others were doing to document the growing phenomenon of lynching of
blacks in the Jim Crow South, see IDA B. WELLS, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE (Alfreda M. Duster ed.,
1970); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909–1950, at 5–7
(1980), some reformers highlighted intraracial lynchings when advancing specific examples of the
negative consequences of a regime in which convictions are lightly reversed on technicalities. See,
e.g., Wheeler, Letter to the Editor, supra note 33, at 8.
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B. Responsibility of the Legal Academy and Profession
1. The Law Schools
Reformers, a number of whom were prominent law professors, also called
upon the academy to do its part in advancing the adoption and application of
the harmless error rule in criminal appellate practice. This call to action had
two facets. First, reformers requested that legal scholars redouble their efforts
in producing scholarship in the area of adjudicatory criminal procedure and
appellate procedure.100 Thus, as the campaign effectively had utilized legal
scholarship as a platform for advancing its legislative agenda, it sought to use
scholarly research to help shift the legal culture toward the harmless error
approach.
In addition, reformers asked law schools to do a much better job of
preparing law students for practice,101 presumably because pedagogical
innovation would pay dividends down the road with attorneys who would
eschew the ―gamesmanship‖ reformers associated with the presumption of
prejudice and automatic reversal regime. 102 Furthermore, the reformers
believed, law students exposed to inquiries into the shortcomings of criminal
justice would be better equipped to work toward solutions when called to the
Bar.103
2. The Bar
Complementing this charge to law schools for better training of future
lawyers was a call to the profession for increasing the quality of prosecutors
and the Bar in general through improved hiring standards and increased
opportunities for continuing legal education. 104 An interesting feature of the
campaign was that it sometimes employed a fairly strident, class-based
critique of the Bar. Perhaps because of the professional accomplishment and
status of many of those leading the harmless error campaign, there was a
not-so-subtle appeal to ―class divisions‖ within the Bar; the reluctance of the
legal profession to embrace the harmless error approach, some reformers
opined, was due in part to those in the criminal defense bar who were

100. See, e.g., Orfield, Appeal Under the American Law Institute, supra note 70, at 453.
101. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 210.
102. See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY, supra note 12, at 417; Kavanagh, supra note 12, at 221; cf.
TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 15 (describing ―battles of bright or dull wits in the courtroom on witless
technicalities‖).
103. See, e.g., Report on Improvement of Criminal Justice, supra note 55, at 518–19.
104. See ROALFE, supra note 22, at 60 (describing John Wigmore as an early advocate of
continuing legal education); ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 208–09; Orfield, Appeal Under the American
Law Institute, supra note 70, at 453; Report on Improvement of Criminal Justice, supra note 55, at
519; MacChesney, supra note 39, at 529.
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perceived to possess lesser talents than those in other segments of the Bar. 105
The implication was that these opponents of the harmless error rule were
lesser lawyers who exploited the strict rule of automatic reversal to make up
for their lack of training, intelligence, and skill. 106
V. FINAL VICTORY—ESTABLISHMENT OF HARMLESS ERROR THROUGH
JUDICIAL RULEMAKING
Despite their substantial legislative victories, many reformers believed
that establishment of the harmless error rule by court rulemaking rather than
by statute was the preferred course. Reformers thought rulemaking was
superior to legislative activity because courts could apply expertise and
experience to the task of developing harmless error rules, whereas legislators
drafting harmless error statutes may not have had legal training.107 In
addition, whereas procedural reform such as the adoption of the harmless
error rule could occupy but a tiny sliver of a broad agenda in any given
legislative session, courts did not have the same level of competing interests
and priorities to distract them from the task. 108 Furthermore, court rulemaking
made sense to the reformers, given that courts would be charged with
implementing, applying, and interpreting the harmless error rule. 109 Finally,
reformers thought that there would be greater ―buy-in‖ to the harmless error
doctrine from appellate judges if the rules were established by courts rather
than legislatures.110
However, on the reformers‘ largest stage—the federal level—there would
be a significant wait for judicial rule-based establishment of the harmless
error rule in criminal cases to follow on the 1919 federal harmless error
statute. In 1940, Congress granted the U.S. Supreme Court authority to
promulgate rules of federal criminal procedure. 111 The advisory committee‘s
105. See, e.g., Hadley, Outline of Code, supra note 26, at 691; Hadley, supra note 17, at 679
(―The criminal practice has, except in unusual cases, been abandoned as unremunerative and
unattractive by the great majority of our better lawyers.‖).
106. See, e.g., E.J. McDermott, Delays and Reversals on Technical Grounds in Criminal
Trials, 2 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 28, 28 (1911). Similar rhetoric was used to describe
state legislators who resisted harmless error legislation. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 199–
200. These legislators, many of whom had solo or small law practices, were accused of protecting
their interest in maintaining the status quo, which rewarded gamesmanship in trial litigation over skill
and training. See id.
107. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 201.
108. See, e.g., id.
109. See, e.g., id.; Elihu Root, Letter to the Editor, Is All Error Presumptively Prejudicial?—
Mr. Root’s Views, 84 CENT. L.J. 310, 310 (1917).
110. See, e.g., ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 201.
111. Act of June 29, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-675, 54 Stat. 688. For background on the formation
of the Rules Advisory Committee and the process for the drafting of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, see Fairfax, supra note 91, at 437–39; Alexander Holtzoff, Participation of the Bar in
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unpublished preliminary draft of the rules included a provision for harmless
error—(Unpublished) Preliminary Draft Rule 41—which read as follows:
―Harmless Error. Errors and defects of any kind which do not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded.‖112
After receiving early feedback from the Supreme Court, the unpublished
draft was edited and the First Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure was transmitted to Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone in May
1943.113 The draft, consisting of fifty-six rules and 216 pages, contained
extensive notes and annotations, evidence of the tremendous effort expended
by the committee in the year since the unpublished preliminary draft had been
completed. The harmless error rule in the first preliminary draft was
reworded slightly and recaptioned Rule 48, which included, just as the
Supreme Court had suggested in its feedback on the earlier unpublished
preliminary draft, a plain error provision:
Rule 48. Harmless Error and Plain Error.
(a) HARMLESS ERROR. Any error, defect, irregularity, or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.
(b) PLAIN ERROR. Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the court.114
The annotation to Rule 48(a) commented that the proposed provision
superseded in criminal cases and contained the substance of the 1919

Judicial Rule-Making, 3 F.R.D. 165 (1944). The Supreme Court recently had promulgated rules
governing civil procedure and appellate procedure. See ORFIELD, supra note 15, at 304; Fairfax,
supra note 91, at 438. The appellate rules did not contain a harmless error provision. See Act of
February 24, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-371, 47 Stat. 904, amended by Act of March 8, 1934, Pub L. No.
73-117, 48 Stat. 399 (authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate federal appellate rules).
112. In a memorandum incorporating the Supreme Court‘s comments on the preliminary draft
of the rules, the Justices queried whether there should ―be added a provision that plain error, when
prejudicial, may be noticed by an appellate court.‖ See Memorandum of June 10, 1942, at 12
(attached to Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the U.S., to Arthur T. Vanderbilt,
Chairman, Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure (June 16, 1942), in 1 DRAFTING
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11, 24 (Madeleine J. Wilken &
Nicholas Triffin eds., 1991) [hereinafter DRAFTING HISTORY]). The particular comment also
questioned whether a provision should be added to Rule 41 or elsewhere making clear that only upon
a finding of prejudice would a variance between the indictment and proof warrant reversal of a
conviction or dismissal of a charge. See Memorandum of June 10, 1942, supra, at 12. No further
Supreme Court comment, however, was focused on the existence or merits of the harmless error rule.
113. See Letter from Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chairman, Advisory Comm. on the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the U.S. (May 3, 1943), in FED. R. CRIM. P.,
at xiii (First Preliminary Draft 1943).
114. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48 (First Preliminary Draft 1943); see also Memorandum of June 10,
1942, supra note 112, at 12.
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harmless error statute,115 as well as the 1872 statute which saved grand jury
indictments (and criminal proceedings based thereupon) from nonprejudicial
errors of form.116 The annotation went on to explain: ―In thus rejecting, as did
Congress in [the 1919 harmless error statute], the older doctrine that prejudice
should be presumed from the commission of error, this proposal reflects the
spirit of the rules as a whole, as expressed in proposed Rule 2 (Purpose and
Construction).‖117 This ―spirit of the rules as a whole‖ included the desire for
―simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay.‖118
Committee chairman Arthur T. Vanderbilt stressed to Chief Justice Stone
the advisory committee‘s desire to obtain ―the suggestions of judges and
lawyers‖ across the nation ―[b]efore the Committee would feel justified in
making any definitive recommendations to the Court‖ regarding the proposed
rules. 119 Chief Justice Stone gave the Committee permission to distribute the
first preliminary draft of the rules to ―members of the profession and others
especially interested, and invite the submission of their views to the
Committee.‖120 The first preliminary draft of the rules was thus circulated at
the end of May 1943, and comments and suggestions were requested by
September 15, 1943.121 Committees appointed by the federal district courts
reviewed the preliminary draft in most districts, and invitation was made to
bar associations and committees, individual attorneys, and individual judges
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 391 (1926), amended by Act of Jan. 31, 1928, Pub L. No. 70-10, 45 Stat.
54 (―On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial, in any case, civil
or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court,
without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.‖).
116. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48 note to subdivision (a) (First Preliminary Draft 1943); see also
18 U.S.C. § 556 (1926), amended by Act of May 18, 1933, Pub L. No. 73-16, 48 Stat. 58 (―[N]o
indictment found and presented by a grand jury in any district or circuit or other court of the United
States shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be
affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the
prejudice of the defendant . . . .‖). The annotation also compared FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (Harmless Error)
and 59 (New Trials). FED. R. CRIM. P. 48 note to subdivision (a) (First Preliminary Draft 1943).
117. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48 note to subdivision (a) (First Preliminary Draft 1943).
118. See id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (First Preliminary Draft 1943) (―Rule 2. Purpose and
Construction. These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal
proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and
the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.‖).
119. Letter from Vanderbilt to Stone, supra note 113.
120. Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the U.S., to Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chairman,
Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure (May 22, 1943), in FED. R. CRIM. P., at xvii
(First Preliminary Draft 1943). Chief Justice Stone made clear that the Court had not engaged in any
substantive review of the rules, but rather had examined the draft to ensure they were ―in form for
submission to the Bench and Bar, and to others interested in an improved criminal procedure for the
federal courts.‖ Id.
121. FED. R. CRIM. P. foreword, at iv (First Preliminary Draft 1943).
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to transmit suggestions to the Advisory Committee directly, or via the local
committees. 122 The Rules also were discussed as part of the Institute on
Federal Criminal Rules, conducted in conjunction with the American Bar
Association 1943 annual meeting and the Judicial Conference of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Despite the hundreds of pages worth
of suggestions and recommendations received by the advisory committee,
Rule 48(a) of the first preliminary draft was not the object of much
commentary,123 an indication of the greatly diminished controversy
surrounding the harmless error rule by this time. 124
The second preliminary draft of the rules was transmitted to the Supreme
Court in November 1943 and distributed to the legal community for comment
in February 1944.125 The numerical designation of the harmless error rule was
shifted from Rule 48(a) to Rule 55(a), but no substantive change was made to
the text of the rule or the annotations. 126 There were no comments submitted
through the notice and comment process regarding the harmless error rule in
the second preliminary draft.127
The final draft of the rules was submitted to the Supreme Court in July
1944. The text of Rule 55(a) did not change from the second preliminary
draft, though the numerical designation was shifted to Rule 52(a). The
annotation to Rule 52(a) was streamlined a bit in the final draft, stating at the
outset that ―[t]his rule is a restatement of existing law,‖ and quoting both the
122. Id. at iii.
123. See generally 1–2 COMMENTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED
CONCERNING THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1943)
(published separately on Sept. 25, 1943, and Oct. 4, 1943) [hereinafter COMMENTS], reprinted in
2–3 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 112. Indeed the sole comment directed toward Rule 48(a) came
from the Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure of the Brooklyn Bar Association, which
suggested that ―[t]here should be added that if there is a divided vote in the Appellate Court as to
whether the error is ‗harmless,‘ that very division should create a reasonable doubt and a new trial
granted.‖ 2 COMMENTS, supra, at 541.
124. It should be noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated in 1938,
contained a harmless error provision, an earlier achievement of the broader procedural reform
movement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (1938).
125. See FED. R. CRIM. P. foreword, at iv (Second Preliminary Draft 1944).
126. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 55(a) (Second Preliminary Draft 1944).
127. See generally 3–4 COMMENTS, supra note 123 (published separately on May 29, 1944,
and June 6, 1944). The Supreme Court, however, did comment on the harmless error provision in
Rule 55(a) of the second preliminary draft. See Memorandum of Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of
the U.S., to Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chairman, Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Apr. 11, 1944), at 5, in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 112, at 9 (―Would it not be well for the
annotation to this rule to state that by it it is intended to adopt the rulings on this subject of
McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 347, 348 [(1936)]; Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287
[(1939)]; Glas[s]er v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 67 [(1942)], and not merely to adopt as a rule that
if there is evidence to support the conviction, error can be disregarded. There is a strong tendency
for the courts in some of the circuits to treat almost any error as non-prejudicial if there is substantial
evidence to support the conviction.‖).
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1919 harmless error statute and the 1872 grand jury statute which appeared in
the annotations to the previous versions of the rule. 128 Chief Justice Stone
submitted the Advisory Committee‘s final report and draft of proposed rules
to Attorney General Francis Biddle, who passed them along to Congress a
month later.129 On March 21, 1946, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
went into effect, and included among them was Rule 52(a): ―Any error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded.‖130 The federal harmless error rule in criminal cases had been
established fully through court rulemaking. 131
Attorney General Tom Clark, when introducing the final version of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946, considered them the
culmination of the criminal procedural reform project of the early twentieth
century.132 Likewise, Rule 52(a)‘s harmless error provision certainly was seen
as the cornerstone of that successful project. The reformers would declare
victory in shifting both the law of criminal appellate review and the attitude of

128. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 note to subdivision (a) (Final Draft 1945).
129. See Letter from Francis Biddle, Attorney General, to the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States (Jan. 3, 1945), in FED. R. CRIM. P., at iii (1946); Letter from
Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the U.S., to Francis Biddle, Attorney General (Dec. 26, 1944), in
FED. R. CRIM. P., at v (1946).
130. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (1946). The rule was meant to affect the purpose of, and make no
change to, the substance of the 1919 harmless error statute. See Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633,
638 n.3 (1946) (noting that Rule 52(a) ―is merely a restatement of existing law and effects no change
in the ‗harmless error‘ rule‖). It should be noted that, two years after Rule 52 was promulgated,
Congress repealed the 1919 harmless error statute, see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat.
998, and then later passed a supplemental harmless error statute to remove any lingering doubt about
the status of the harmless error rule in American criminal practice. See Act of May 24, 1949,
ch. 139, § 110, 63 Stat. 105 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006)); see also Saltzburg, supra
note 3, at 1006 n.57. The statute, which explicitly applied the harmless error rule to federal appellate
courts, even though the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure already had done so, was passed either
out of an abundance of caution or ―on the mistaken belief‖ that the Fed eral Rules of Criminal
Procedure applied only to the federal district courts. Edwards, supra note 3, at 1174 n.11 (quoting
3A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 852, at 296 (2d ed. 1982)); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 81-352, at 18 (1949) (noting that Section 110 of the bill ―[i]ncorporates in title
28, U.S.C., as section 2111 thereof, the harmless error provisions of section 269 of the Judicial Code
(now repealed), which applied to all courts of the United States and to all cases therein and therefore
was superseded only in part by the Federal Procedural Rules, which apply only to the United States
district courts‖).
131. See, e.g., Note, The Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 450 (1947)
(noting that ―[t]he later trend, by decision, constitutional amendment, statute and rule of court, has
been toward a return to orthodoxy, requiring affirmance where errors have been harmless‖).
However, questions of application of the harmless error rule—which errors are deemed to be
harmless—remained an open question after 1946, see id. at 450–51, and, indeed, continue to
challenge courts to this day, see, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 4, at 2029.
132. Tom C. Clark, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Foreword, 6 N.Y.U. SCH. L. INST.
PROC., at iii (1946) (―[T]he effective date of the Rules[] closes a struggle, lasting several decades, to
achieve procedural reform through judicial rule making.‖).
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appellate judges and the legal profession as a whole over the forty years
following Roscoe Pound‘s 1906 call to action. By the time the Supreme
Court would take up Chapman v. California133 a generation later, in 1967, the
question was no longer whether appellate courts would apply the harmless
error rule to so-called technical errors, but rather how the harmless error rule
would be applied to constitutional errors—a tremendous shift in the legal
consciousness.134 It is safe to say that such a transformation was due to the
efforts of those engaged in the campaign for harmless error.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the early twentieth-century reformers achieved their goal of
establishing the harmless error rule in American criminal appellate practice, in
form and substance, it is fair to ask whether the harmless error rule has
achieved its intended goals. As has been suggested, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure themselves were a tangible product of the same forty-year
campaign to improve the administration of criminal justice in the United
States. Therefore, it is probably appropriate to judge the harmless error rule
against the process values articulated by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, including efficiency, finality, public confidence, and the fair
administration of justice. 135
Certainly, all of these important values are advanced by the fact that socalled ―technical‖ errors no longer are presumed prejudicial or prompt
automatic reversal. However, at what cost have these aims been achieved?
Has the pendulum swung too far in the other direction? Some recognize that
the harmless error rule revolutionized criminal appellate practice and brought
it in line with the needs of modern criminal justice, but note that its
application is sometimes flawed.136 Still others have argued that harmless
error review, particularly as applied to constitutional errors, is per se
illegitimate.137
133. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
134. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 3, at 1175–76. Indeed, in 1952, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved uniform rules of criminal procedure, which
contained a harmless error provision based upon FED. R. CRIM. P. 52. See UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 51
(1952) (Rule 57).
135. FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (―These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just determination
of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration, and to
eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.‖).
136. For example, the author has written elsewhere that the harmless error rule has been
applied incorrectly in at least one respect—when appellate courts apply harmless error and make
findings as to whether a jury that was not instructed on all the elements of an offense ―would have‖
found the missing element given the evidence presented, had the jury been properly instructed. See
Fairfax, supra note 4, at 2027; see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of
Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152 (1991).
137. See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Constitutional Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief,
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Though views about the utility and fairness of the harmless error rule may
vary, it cannot be denied that it is emblematic of the robust and successful
criminal procedure reform activity begun a century ago. The fruits of these
reformers‘ efforts modernized and forever changed criminal procedure and
the administration of criminal justice across the United States. Today, efforts
have begun anew to reevaluate and improve the administration of criminal
justice in the United States.138 Our quest for a more fair, efficient, and just
criminal justice system—the overarching aim of our predecessors who came
together as bench, bar, and academy a century ago to reform criminal
procedure—is just as vital and necessary now as it was then.

71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1980).
138. See, e.g., National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2009, S. 714, 111th Cong. (2009)
(legislation proposing to create a national commission to comprehensively reevaluate criminal law
and sentencing policies). The Obama Department of Justice recently has undertaken an effort to
consider possible reform of federal sentencing policy. See Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks at
the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice and Congressional Black Caucus
Symposium: Rethinking Federal Sentencing Policy 25th Anniversary of the Sentencing Reform Act,
(June 24, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-0906241.html. In
addition, the ALI and ABA are actively considering a number of criminal law-related reforms. See
The
American
Law
Institute,
86th
Annual
Meeting,
http://www.ali.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=meetings.annual_updates_09 (last visited Apr. 23, 2010); Congress on
Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION UPDATE (A.B.A. Criminal Justice
Section, Wash., D.C.), May 2009 (on file with author).

